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| Rittwik Chatterjee |
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| ''Multi-stage Double Auctions With Many Bidders'' |
| ( 2011, Vol. 31 No.2 ) |
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| Traditionally in a Double Auction (also known as Bilateral Trade) a seller and a buyer interact to sell an object. Earlier literature had shown that in such a situation no mechanism will guarantee efficiency, incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and balanced budget condition. In this note we will argue that if we “sufficiently” increase the number of buyers then there is a two stage mechanism which satisfies all the four conditions stated above. |
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| Keywords: Bidding Strategies, Double Auctions |
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
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| Manuscript Received : Mar 29 2011 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jun 25 2011 |
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