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Hugues Tchantcho, Issofa Moyouwou and Nicolas G. Andjiga
 
''On the bargaining set of three-player games''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.1 )
 
 
The description and the characterization of the (Aumann-Maschler) bargaining set are known, but its determination is still hard given a generic transferable utility cooperative game. We provide here an exhaustive determination of the bargaining set of any three-player game, balanced or not, superadditive or not.
 
 
Keywords: Three-player games, bargaining set, core
 
Manuscript Received : Apr 04 2011 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 29 2012

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