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Srobonti Chattopadhyay and Rittwik Chatterjee
 
''Revenue Equivalence in Sequential Auctions''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.2 )
 
 
The revenue equivalence theorem is an widely known result in Auction Theory. This note generalize that theorem for the case of Sequential Auctions. Our results show that under a class of Sequential Auction, if an symmetric and increasing equilibrium bidding strategy exists, then the revenue equivalence still holds for that class of Sequential Auctions.
 
 
Keywords: Sequential Auction, Revenue Equivalence
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Jul 14 2011 Manuscript Accepted : Apr 24 2012

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