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Gil S Epstein and Yosef Mealem
 
''Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.1 )
 
 
We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) where all players act independently; and (ii) where the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a higher expected payoff) in the non-cooperative regime than in the cooperative regime. .
 
 
Keywords: Contests, rent seeking, public good, easy-riding
JEL: H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
 
Manuscript Received : Sep 27 2011 Manuscript Accepted : Feb 12 2012

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