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| Gil S Epstein and Yosef Mealem |
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| ''Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests'' |
| ( 2012, Vol. 32 No.1 ) |
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| We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) where all players act independently; and (ii) where the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a higher expected payoff) in the non-cooperative regime than in the cooperative regime. . |
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| Keywords: Contests, rent seeking, public good, easy-riding |
JEL: H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Sep 27 2011 | | Manuscript Accepted : Feb 12 2012 |
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