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ralph lauren polo

 
Min-Hung Tsay
 
''Preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology: comment''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.2 )
 
 
In this comment, we show that the existence of the preemption equilibrium in Fudenberg and Tirole (Review of Economics Studies, vol. 52, PP. 383-401, 1985)'s continuous-time games of timing is not guaranteed under their assumptions.
 
 
Keywords: Dynamic Entry, Preemption, Rent Equalization, Technology Adoption, Timing Games.
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
 
Manuscript Received : Oct 02 2011 Manuscript Accepted : Jun 10 2012

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