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| Emilie Dargaud |
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| ''Endogenous mergers and maximal concentration: a note'' |
| ( 2012, Vol. 32 No.1 ) |
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| This article examines the incentive to merge in a Bertrand competition model with generalized substitutability and price competition. The model suggests that acquisition of firms by their rivals can result in maximal concentration of the industry. |
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| Keywords: endogenous mergers, concentration, price competition |
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Oct 25 2011 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jan 13 2012 |
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