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Uuganbaatar Ninjbat
 
''Symmetry vs. complexity in proving the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.2 )
 
 
In this short note, we first provide two rather straightforward proofs for the Muller - Satterthwaite theorem in the baseline cases of 2 person 3 alternatives, and 2 person n ≥ 3 alternatives. We also show that it suffices to prove the result in the special case of 3 alternatives (with arbitrary N individuals) as it then can easily be extended to the general case. We then prove the result in the decisive case of 3 alternatives (with arbitrary N individuals) by induction on N.
 
 
Keywords: the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem, Monotone social choice functions
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
 
Manuscript Received : Nov 10 2011 Manuscript Accepted : May 14 2012

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