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Hsiao-Chi Chen, Yunshyong Chow and Li-Chau Wu
 
''Imitation, local interaction, and efficiency: reappraisal''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.1 )
 
 
We revisit the model of Alos-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006) but under the assumption that risk-dominant equilibria are Pareto efficient. It is found that risk-dominant equilibria, non-risk-dominant equilibria, and some non-monomorphic states can emerge in the long run when players interact with their immediate neighbors only.
 
 
Keywords: Coordination game, imitation, local interaction
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D0 - Microeconomics: General
 
Manuscript Received : Nov 20 2011 Manuscript Accepted : Feb 20 2012

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