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Kaniska Dam and Antonio Jimenez-Martinez
 
''A note on bargaining over complementary pieces of information in networks''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.4 )
 
 
We consider two specific network structures, the star and the line, and study the set of bilateral alternating-offers bargaining processes for the pairs of linked agents. Agents have complementary information, bargain simultaneously over the price of their pieces of information, and benefit from their exchanges only after they finish all their negotiation processes. We propose meaningful distributions of the initial bargaining power of the agents according to the restrictions to negotiation imposed by the network, and study the resulting equilibrium prices and payoffs.
 
 
Keywords: Bilateral bargaining, information exchange, first-mover advantage, networks
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
 
Manuscript Received : Dec 05 2011 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 07 2012

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