All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Alfredo Salgado-Torres
 
''A simple decentralized matching mechanism in markets with couples''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.3 )
 
 
We analyze a simple decentralized matching mechanism in market with couples called One Application Mechanism. Under this mechanism any stable matching of the market can be attained in Subgame Perfect equilibrium (SPE). In contrast with previous results, we find that the mechanism may attain unstable matchings in SPE. We show that only one special kind of instability is admissible in equilibrium and we argue that this exclusively comes from coordination failures between members of couples. Our main result shows that the One Application Mechanism implements in SPE the set of pairwise stable matchings in markets with couples.
 
 
Keywords: Markets with couples, Decentralized matching, Stable matchings, Implementation
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Feb 08 2012 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 22 2012

  This abstract has been downloaded 298 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 87723 times