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María Gómez-Rúa
 
''Sharing a polluted river network through environmental taxes''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.1 )
 
 
Gómez-Rúa (2011, SERIE’s) considers a river divided into n segments. In each segment there is exactly one agent, who releases some kind of residue into the water. An environmental authority must share the total cost of cleaning the river network among all the agents. In this paper we extend the results obtained there, to the context of a river network and so we propose several rules to distribute the total cleaning-cost among the agents. Furthermore, we provide axiomatic characterizations for them using properties based on water taxes. Besides we prove that one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value of a game associated to the problem.
 
 
Keywords: cost sharing, pollutant-cleaning cost, water taxes, river network.
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D6 - Welfare Economics: General
 
Manuscript Received : Feb 09 2012 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 26 2012

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