Mustafa Oguz Afacan   ''On The "Group Non-bossiness" Property'' ( 2012, Vol. 32 No.2 )     We extend the concept of non-bossiness to groups of agents and say that a mechanism is group non-bossy if no group of agents can change the assignment of someone else while theirs being unaffected by misreporting their preferences. First, we show that they are not equivalent properties. We, then, prove that group strategy-proofness is sufficient for group non-bossiness. While this result implies that the top trading cycles mechanism is group non-bossy, it also provides a characterization of the market structures in which the deferred acceptance algorithm is group non-bossy.     Keywords: Non-bossiness, Group non-bossiness, Group strategy-proofness, Assignment, Mechanism. JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General   Manuscript Received : Apr 20 2012   Manuscript Accepted : May 23 2012   This abstract has been downloaded 1717 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 158492 times