All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Luciana C Moscoso Boedo and Antonio Jimenez-Martinez
 
''Identifying defectors in a population with short-run players.''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.2 )
 
 
This paper considers a repeated Prisoner’s' Dilemma game to explore how an information mechanism that labels defectors can help sustain cooperation in societies that include short-run players. We provide sufficient conditions under which there exists equilibria that sustain cooperation for different information technologies that identify defectors. We also analyze imperfect labeling mechanisms.
 
 
Keywords: short-run players, population game, labeling mechanism
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jun 26 2012 Manuscript Accepted : Jun 09 2015

  This abstract has been downloaded 598 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 103166 times