All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Yajing Chen
 
''A new Pareto efficient school choice mechanism''
( 2013, Vol. 33 No.1 )
 
 
This paper proposes a new school choice mechanism called the recursive Boston mechanism (RBM), which is similar to the well-known Boston mechanism. While the Boston mechanism considers the reduced problem of the original problem after removing students and their assignments in the previous step, RBM considers the subproblem. We show that RBM does not satisfy strategy-proofness and stability, but satisfies Pareto efficiency. Moreover, the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation game induced by RBM is equivalent to the set of stable matchings with respect to the true preferences of students.
 
 
Keywords: School choice; Recursive Boston mechanism; Pareto efficiency
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jul 03 2012 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 30 2013

  This abstract has been downloaded 637 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 103166 times