All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Derek J Clark and Jean-Christophe Pereau
''Vertical integration through Rubinstein bargaining''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.3 )
We consider a vertical structure in which an upstream manufacturer bargains with a downstream retailer over the price of an intermediate good. In an alternating offers framework, we show that when the managers of the firms can choose their response time in the negotiation that the solution conforms either to the non-intergrated or fully integrated structure from standard models of successive monopoly.
Keywords: bargaining, successive monopoly, asymmetric response times.
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Manuscript Received : Aug 08 2012 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 09 2012

  This abstract has been downloaded 1590 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 154655 times