All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Domenico Buccella
 
''Unions' bargaining coordination in multi-unit firms''
( 2013, Vol. 33 No.1 )
 
 
This paper investigates the patterns of bargaining in a multi-unit firm in the presence of labor unions coordination activities. It derives the bargaining regimes arising as sub-game perfect equilibria, considering both simultaneous and sequential games where parties choose whether to coordinate wage negotiations. It shows that unions' coordination costs may attenuate the conflict of interests between bargaining parties as regards the centralization level at which negotiations should take place.
 
 
Keywords: bargaining, multi-unit firm, labor unions.
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
 
Manuscript Received : Sep 25 2012 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 25 2013

  This abstract has been downloaded 558 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 102570 times