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Katsuhiko Nishizaki
 
''An impossibility theorem for secure implementation in discrete public good economies''
( 2013, Vol. 33 No.1 )
 
 
This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjostrom, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) in discrete public good economies with quasi-linear preferences. We find that only constant social choice functions are securely implementable over the domains that satisfy partial dominance introduced in this paper. Partial dominance is a reasonable condition because the set of all strictly increasing and strictly concave valuation functions satisfies this condition.
 
 
Keywords: Secure implementation, Dominant strategy implementation, Nash implementation, Strategy-proofness, Discrete public good
JEL: H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Nov 09 2012 Manuscript Accepted : Feb 07 2013

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