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Takashi Ui and Yasunori Yoshizawa
 
''Radner's Theorem on Teams and Games with a Continuum of Players''
( 2013, Vol. 33 No.1 )
 
 
This note considers Bayesian games with a continuum of players, symmetric quadratic payoff functions, and normally distributed signals. It shows that a recent result on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is implied by a classical theorem on teams by Radner (1962, Ann. Math. Stat. 33).
 
 
Keywords: unique linear equilibrium, Bayesian potential game, team.
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
 
Manuscript Received : Nov 27 2012 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 08 2013

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