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Yizhaq Minchuk
 
''Low and High Types of Bidders in Asymmetric Auctions with A General Utility Function''
( 2013, Vol. 33 No.2 )
 
 
We study asymmetric first-price auctions with n bidders. We expand the results of Fibich et al. (2002) for asymmetric first-price auctions to a general utility function. We show that for low type bidders, the equality of equilibrium bids with symmetric, uniform distribution bids holds for the general case of a utility function. For high types of bidders, those with weaker distributions bid more aggressively than stronger bidders under mild assumptions of a utility function.
 
 
Keywords: asymmetry, first-price auction.
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jan 27 2013 Manuscript Accepted : Jun 03 2013

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