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Fan-chin Kung
 
''Public Good Coalitions and Membership Exclusion''
( 2013, Vol. 33 No.2 )
 
 
Many local public goods are provided in coalitions. When coalitions form they may have the power to exclude members. The core applies to such cases. When coalitions cannot exclude members, all who prefer the provided public good can join. The no-exodus equilibrium is proposed for such cases. It is an extension of the Tiebout equilibrium in the long run when the number of coalitions can vary and membership exclusion is not granted.
 
 
Keywords: coalition, public goods
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jan 31 2013 Manuscript Accepted : Jun 07 2013

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