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Jaesoo Kim and Jongwoo Park
 
''Monitoring in Tournaments''
( 2014, Vol. 34 No.3 )
 
 
We show that less monitoring can increase effort and alleviate the moral hazard problem in tournaments. We also find a unique optimal level of monitoring based on contestants' abilities. As the difference between their abilities gets larger, the contest designer should monitor less.
 
 
Keywords: tournament, moral hazard, monitoring
JEL: M5 - Personnel Economics: General
 
Manuscript Received : Apr 09 2013 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 08 2014

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