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ralph lauren polo

 
Simiao Li
 
''Tullock contests under committee administration''
( 2013, Vol. 33 No.3 )
 
 
Much of the Tullock contest (Tullock 1980) literature analyzes rent-seeking efforts under the assumption of a single prize administrator. Here, I allow a committee to decide the winner of the rent-seeking contest according to simple majority voting rule, and study the impact of committee size on rent-seeking expenditures. I find that increasing the size of the committee produces an ambiguous impact on total rent-seeking efforts, with the heterogeneity of the contestants acting as the factor determining a resultant increase or decrease in efforts.
 
 
Keywords: Committee Administration; Rent-seeking; Heterogeneity
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
 
Manuscript Received : May 29 2013 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 02 2013

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