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Camilla Di Luca, Josep M Izquierdo and Carles Rafels
 
''Remarks on the proportional distribution in increasing return to scale problems''
( 2013, Vol. 33 No.4 )
 
 
We study a cooperative problem where agents contribute a certain amount of input in order to obtain a surplus. We assume that the average surplus with respect to the amount contributed is increasing. Within this basic model, a cooperative game is associated and the proportional distribution arises as a natural core allocation. We describe a necessary and sufficient condition for which the core of the game shrinks to the proportional distribution. Furthermore, we characterize axiomatically the proportional distribution by means of three properties: core-selection, core-invariance and resource monotonicity. Finally, we provide a condition that guarantees that the proportional nucleolus coincides with the proportional solution.
 
 
Keywords: cooperative game, proportional distribution, core, nucleolus
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Jun 21 2013 Manuscript Accepted : Dec 23 2013

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