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Hironori Otsubo
 
''Do campaign spending limits diminish competition? An experiment''
( 2013, Vol. 33 No.3 )
 
 
This paper experimentally investigates the effect of limits on campaign expenditure and outcome in an electoral contest where two candidates, an incumbent and a challenger, compete for office in terms of the amount of campaign expenditure. The candidates are asymmetric only in that the incumbent wins the contest in case of a tie. Theory predicts that in the presence of such asymmetry spending limits put the challenger at a disadvantage and tightening the limits leads to further entrenchment of the incumbent. The experimental results confirmed the theoretical predictions.
 
 
Keywords: Electoral contest; Spending limit; Incumbency advantage; Experiment
JEL: C9 - Design of Experiments: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Jul 21 2013 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 03 2013

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