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Tanmoyee Banerjee (Chatterjee) and Nilanjana Biswas( Mitra)
 
''Product Quality in the presence of Network Externality and Commercial Piracy''
( 2013, Vol. 33 No.4 )
 
 
Our paper develops a two-stage sequential game between an incumbent and a pirate to find the optimal quality level of the firm in the presence of network externality. The results show that the incumbent in the presence of piracy chooses minimum quality for its product and undertakes an anti-copying investment that adversely affects the effective quality level of the pirated good. Further, under SPNE the incumbent becomes a price leader and the pirate chooses to be a follower.
 
 
Keywords: piracy, network externality effect, anti copying investment
JEL:
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
 
Manuscript Received : Sep 09 2013 Manuscript Accepted : Dec 23 2013

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