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Yizhaq Minchuk
''Aggressive Bidding of Weak Bidders in All-Pay Auction''
( 2014, Vol. 34 No.3 )
We study an asymmetric all-pay auction with a general utility function. We show that high-type bidders in all-pay auction with lower density, are bidding more aggressively than bidders with higher density. This result is contradictory to the result in Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) on aggressive bidding of strong bidders.
Keywords: Asymmetry, all-pay auction.
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Manuscript Received : Feb 24 2014 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 28 2014

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