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Luciano Fanti
 
''Union–firm bargaining agenda: right-to-manage or efficient bargaining?''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.2 )
 
 
In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions. It is shown that an agreement between parties on the bargaining agenda may endogenously emerge only on the Efficient Bargaining arrangement, provided that union's power is not too high.
 
 
Keywords: Efficient bargaining, Right-to-manage, Cournot duopoly
JEL: J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
 
Manuscript Received : May 04 2014 Manuscript Accepted : Apr 09 2015

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