All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Jaideep Chowdhury and Gokhan Sonaer
 
''Investment and Managerial Preferences''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.1 )
 
 
We develop a theoretical model of managerial myopia based on the Q theory of investment. In this model, the manager chooses both investment quantity and the investment horizon. The manager may be myopic, causing an excess weight to be placed by the manager on short term profits, relative to firm-value maximizing behavior. In such a case, investments may be expected to be of a shorter time horizon, even if there are advantages to longer term investing. Our model yields a new important testable implication. The sensitivity of investment to growth opportunities is lower for myopic managers.
 
 
Keywords: Q Theory of Investment, Managerial Myopia
JEL: G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance: General
 
Manuscript Received : May 13 2014 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 11 2015

  This abstract has been downloaded 431 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 104254 times