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Jana Vyrastekova, Esther-Mirjam Sent and Irene van Staveren
''Gender Beliefs and Cooperation in a Public Goods Game''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.2 )
This paper identifies gender beliefs in a public goods game and studies their impact on cooperation. On average, the beliefs of men, but not those of women, depend significantly on the group gender composition, with men expecting groups to be more cooperative when more females are present in the group. Gender beliefs of women are not absent, however, but show more variance than those of men. The contributions to the public good are driven by gender beliefs, and after controlling for them, contributions do not depend on the gender group composition directly.
Keywords: gender beliefs, public goods experiment, gender differences
JEL: C9 - Design of Experiments: General
H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
Manuscript Received : Nov 04 2014 Manuscript Accepted : May 14 2015

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