All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Agnieszka Rusinowska and Ahmet Ozkardas
 
''Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.3 )
 
 
We consider a union-firm wage bargaining in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in case of disagreement, and preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences of discount rates varying in time. We show that there may exist inefficient subgame perfect equilibria in the model under which the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement. For an inefficient equilibrium to exist, the status quo wage must be sufficiently low and the amounts that the firm offers for itself in the subgame perfect equilibrium under the exogenous always strike decision in every odd period before reaching an agreement must be sufficiently low.
 
 
Keywords: union - firm bargaining, varying discount rates, subgame perfect equilibrium, inefficient equilibria, strike
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
 
Manuscript Received : Nov 19 2014 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 21 2015

  This abstract has been downloaded 336 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 103264 times