All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Michiko Ogaku
 
''Managerial Incentive Problems: The Role of Multiple Signals''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.1 )
 
 
Career concerns can mitigate moral hazard problems, but these diminish as the agent's retirement age approaches. Addressing this problem, this note draws attention to the role of the interaction between contractible and non-contractible signals.
 
 
Keywords: Career concerns, Moral hazard, Non-contractible signals, Contractible signals
JEL: D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
 
Manuscript Received : Dec 01 2014 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 11 2015

  This abstract has been downloaded 456 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 104254 times