All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Anna Moskalenko
 
''A mechanism to pick the deserving winner''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.3 )
 
 
A group of individuals is choosing an individual (the winner) among themselves, when the identity of the deserving winner is a common knowledge among individuals. A simple mechanism of voting by veto is proposed as an alternative to the mechanism studied by Amorós (2011). Like Amorós'(2011), the suggested mechanism implements the socially desirable outcome (the deserving winner is chosen) in subgame perfect equilibria.
 
 
Keywords: Implementation, mechanism design, subgame perfect equilibrium, individuals choosing among themselves, voting by veto.
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Dec 12 2014 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 11 2015

  This abstract has been downloaded 481 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 104272 times