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Haris Aziz
 
''Condorcet's Paradox and the Median Voter Theorem for Randomized Social Choice''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.1 )
 
 
Condorcet's paradox is one of the most prominent results in social choice theory. It says that there may not exist any alternative that a net majority prefers over every other alternative. When outcomes need not be deterministic alternatives, we show that a similar paradox still exists even if preferences are dichotomous. Thus relaxing the requirement of discrete alternatives does not help in circumventing Condorcet's paradox. On the other hand, we show that a fractional/randomized version of Black's Median Voter Theorem still holds for single-peaked preferences.
 
 
Keywords: Social choice theory, Condorcet's Paradox, Median Voter Theorem, Social decision function
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Dec 21 2014 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 28 2015

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