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Kazuki Hiraga
 
''Welfare analysis of civil servants' wage bargaining in a mixed-duopoly approach''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.3 )
 
 
This research examines how wage regulation can be Pareto-improving. We demonstrate the wage regulation of public firms by relaxing the assumption of substitution between private and public goods. In other words, we admit a complementary relationship between private and public goods. Relaxing this assumption provides results both additional to and different from those produced by other models. We find that wage regulation can be Pareto-improving under a moderately strong complementary relationship between private and public goods.
 
 
Keywords: Wage regulation model, Pareto improvement, Complementary relationship
JEL: H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
 
Manuscript Received : Dec 26 2014 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 12 2015

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