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Nadja Kairies
 
''Pay-for-Performance, Reputation, and the Reduction of Costly Overprovision''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.1 )
 
 
We investigate the effect of reputational motivation on output in a scenario of overprovision of medical treatment. We assume that physicians differ in their degree of altruism, enjoy being perceived as good but, dislike being perceived as greedy. We show that better reputational motivation unambiguously reduces the costs of healthcare provision and the magnitude of overprovision which in turn raises patient benefits.
 
 
Keywords: altruism, performance, motivation, reputation
JEL: I1 - Health: General
 
Manuscript Received : Mar 22 2015 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 22 2015

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