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ralph lauren polo

 
António Neto
 
''The Portuguese high school match''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.3 )
 
 
School Choice Theory is one of the research areas in Economics that has an immediate application to reality: every year, thousands of students around the world have to enroll at a new school. This paper introduces the Portuguese School Matching Algorithm and analyzes its main properties. I show that (a) the Portuguese algorithm can be described almost as the deferred-acceptance (DA) algorithm; (b) the constraint in terms of the number of schools parents can submit might harm the strategy-proof characteristic of the DA algorithm; (c) there are still several ways students can manipulate the system of priorities. Finally, I propose a new approach regarding the strategy-proof property by distinguishing between static-strategy-proof and dynamic-strategy-proof.
 
 
Keywords: Matching theory, school matching algorithm, high school
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
I2 - Education: General
 
Manuscript Received : Apr 25 2015 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 21 2015

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