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Diganta Mukherjee and Sreenivasan Subramanian
 
''Direct income transfers and public good provisioning: choosing between two anti-poverty schemes''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.3 )
 
 
In this paper, we consider the economics of choosing between two types of anti-poverty programme: targeted direct income transfers and the universal provisioning of a public good. We construct a simple analytical model to examine the issue. As might be expected, our results suggest that the choice between the two poverty-alleviation schemes would depend on the relative strengths of the productivity of public goods investment on the one hand, and the information costs of targeting benefits, on the other.
 
 
Keywords: poverty, transfer, public good, budget
JEL: I3 - Welfare and Poverty: General
H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jun 02 2015 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 11 2015

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