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Sergey V. Popov
 
''Tenure-track contract helps self-selection''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.4 )
 
 
Tenure-track contract is criticized for curbing the incentives to expend effort after obtaining tenured status. Yet the most productive faculties seem to work on a tenure contract, and schools which aim to employ the best faculty seem to prefer to offer tenure-track contracts to their new recruits. I argue that tenure-track contracts are by construction more attractive to more able freshly minted PhDs, and therefore the observed sorting is rationalizable.
 
 
Keywords: tenure, academia, job market, self-selection
JEL: I2 - Education: General
J4 - Particular Labor Markets: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jun 08 2015 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 21 2015

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