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Samuele Murtinu
 
''Debt Maturity, Ownership Concentration, and Firm Efficiency''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.4 )
 
 
I study the relationship between debt maturity and agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders in unlisted firms. Exploiting cross-province variance in the development of local credit markets, I find that the monitoring effect of short-term bank debt is more effective in firms with less concentrated ownership structures.
 
 
Keywords: Ownership concentration, efficiency, agency cost, debt maturity, monitoring, bank, ownership structure, firm performance, corporate governance, financial debt, unlisted firm, local credit market, endogeneity, agency conflict, entrepreneurial firm, owner-managed firm, minority shareholder, corporate finance, capital structure
JEL: G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance: General
M2 - Business Economics: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jul 20 2015 Manuscript Accepted : Dec 13 2015

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