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Dongryul Lee
 
''Group contests and technologies''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.4 )
 
 
We study the role of returns of scale of the technology on the characterization of the Nash equilibrium in group contests. In the general setting of group contests, we first show that there exists only one type of equilibrium, for given each technology, when the technology is with constant or decreasing returns to scale. However, when the technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, we find that there may exist various types of equilibria according to the parameter values in the model.
 
 
Keywords: Group contests, Public good, Technology
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
 
Manuscript Received : Aug 16 2015 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 21 2015

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