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ralph lauren polo

Tomohiko Tomohiko
''Network Heterogeneity and a Coordination Game''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.4 )
We investigate a two-strategy logit choice coordination game on heterogeneous networks. Degree is a number of links a vertex has and heterogeneous network is a network whose variance of degree distribution is large. We obtain mean-field approximate solution. We show that the heterogeneity of a network has an influence on the outcome. The magnitude of heterogeneity determines the number of stable steady states and the characteristics of the stable steady states. The network heterogeneity also determines which of the stable steady states is realized and the probability that a strategy is chosen in a given stable steady state.
Keywords: Networks, Local Social Interactions, Network Heterogeneity, Scale-free Networks, Coordination Games, Peer Effect, Games on Networks, Logit Choice, Percolations
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Manuscript Received : Sep 29 2015 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 21 2015

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