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Francesc Llerena and Llúcia Mauri |
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''On the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set'' |
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.4 ) |
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In this note we introduce the Lorenz stable set and provide an
axiomatic characterization in terms of constrained egalitarianism
and projection consistency. On the domain of all coalitional
games, we find that this solution connects the weak constrained
egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1989) with their strong
counterpart (Dutta and Ray, 1991). |
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Keywords: cooperative games, Lorenz domination, imputation set |
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Manuscript Received : Oct 04 2015 | | Manuscript Accepted : Nov 21 2015 |
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