All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Francesc Llerena and Llúcia Mauri
 
''On the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.4 )
 
 
In this note we introduce the Lorenz stable set and provide an axiomatic characterization in terms of constrained egalitarianism and projection consistency. On the domain of all coalitional games, we find that this solution connects the weak constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1989) with their strong counterpart (Dutta and Ray, 1991).
 
 
Keywords: cooperative games, Lorenz domination, imputation set
JEL:
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Oct 04 2015 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 21 2015

  This abstract has been downloaded 447 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 103907 times