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Pascal Courty, Daniel Rondeau and Maurice Doyon
 
''Unbundling Truthful Revelation when Auctioning Bundled Goods''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.4 )
 
 
We study a seller who auctions bundles of goods and is interested in learning the buyer's valuations for each individual good. We show that truthful revelation is never the unique dominant strategy when each bundle contains multiple goods. We study the case with linear bundles and propose auction rules that eliminate all non-truthful reports for the Becker-Degroot-Marschak mechanism and the Vickrey auction.
 
 
Keywords: Auction; truthful revelation; Becker-Degroot-Marschak mechanism; Vickrey auction
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
 
Manuscript Received : Oct 22 2015 Manuscript Accepted : Dec 13 2015

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