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ralph lauren polo

 
Kadohognon S Ouattara
 
''How privatization affects the strategic choice of managerial incentives: the case of international mixed duopoly''
( 2016, Vol. 36 No.2 )
 
 
This paper studies a mixed duopoly where a semi-public firm competes with a foreign private firm. The firm's owners have the option to hire a manager. A novel incentive scheme of semi-public firm's manager is utilized which takes into account the social goals of public authority. In contrast to the results in the existing literature, the paper shows that the decision to hire manager depends on the state-ownership share in the semi-public firm. Yet the paper finds that there exists an equilibrium in which only the semi-public firm hires a manager.
 
 
Keywords: MIXED OLIGOPOLY, FOREIGN PRIVATE FIRM, MANAGERIAL DELEGATION
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jan 03 2016 Manuscript Accepted : Jun 11 2016

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