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Dongryul Lee
 
''Average-opinion group contest''
( 2017, Vol. 37 No.1 )
 
 
We study the the average-opinion group contest in which each group's effort level is determined as the median of the effort levels of its group members. We find that, in the average-opinion group contest, both free rider and coordination problem exist among the players in each group, and there exist multiple Nash equilibria of the game. This is the mixed characteristics of each Nash equilibria of the perfect-substitutes, the weakest-link, and the best-shot group contest. Also, we specifically figure out the Nash equilibria of the average-opinion group contest in several examples.
 
 
Keywords: Group contest, Public-goods prize, Average opinion game
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Apr 10 2016 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 13 2017

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