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Toshihiro Matsumura and Akira Ogawa
''Corporate social responsibility and endogenous competition structure''
( 2016, Vol. 36 No.4 )
We assume that firms care about corporate social responsibility (CSR) and revisit the endogenous choice between price and quantity contracts. We find that a significant (insignificant) asymmetric weight of CSR in their objectives yields Bertrand (Cournot) competition.
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, Cournot, Bertrand, welfare-concern objective
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
Manuscript Received : Jul 15 2016 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 09 2016

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