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ralph lauren polo

 
Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez
 
''On single-peakedness and strategy-proofness: ties between adjacent alternatives''
( 2017, Vol. 37 No.3 )
 
 
We extend the classical characterizations of social choice rules that satisfy strategy-proofness in the single-peaked domain of preferences by Moulin (Public Choice, 1980) and Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti (Journal of Economic Theory, 1993) to multivalued social choice rules that admit either the selection of single alternatives or the selection of pairs of adjacent alternatives.
 
 
Keywords: Strategy-Proofness, Single-Peaked Preferences, Preferences over Sets of Alternatives, Minimally Extended Social Choice Functions
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Mar 13 2017 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 31 2017

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