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Zeynep Kantur and Kerim Keskin
 
''On (mis-)perception of probabilities in first-price sealed-bid auctions''
( 2019, Vol. 39 No.1 )
 
 
We study a two-stage probability weighting model [see Tversky and Fox, 1995] in a first-price sealed-bid auction. We present the unique symmetric equilibrium and provide some experimental support for our model.
 
 
Keywords: First-price auctions, Overbidding, Probability misperception, Subjective probability weighting
JEL: D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Apr 16 2018 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 28 2019

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