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| Madhuparna Ganguly and Rupayan Pal |
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| ''Signaling through Public Antitrust Enforcement: An Extension'' |
| ( 2019, Vol. 39 No.1 ) |
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| This note shows that the argument of Šaljanin(2017) [Šaljanin, 2017. “Signaling through public antitrust enforcement”, Economics Letters 169, 4 – 6] that public antitrust enforcement complements private investment is robust to allowing public investment in anti-trust enforcement to be productive. However, unlike as in the case of unproductive public investment, over investment in public antitrust enforcement does not necessarily signal that the government is pro-competition: in pooling equilibria either only the anti-competition government or both types of government over invests, whereas in the separating equilibrium only the pro-competition government over invests. |
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| Keywords: Private and public enforcement, Signaling, Antitrust |
JEL: H1 - Structure and Scope of Government: General
K1 - Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law) |
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| Manuscript Received : Jul 04 2018 | | Manuscript Accepted : Feb 02 2019 |
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