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Ajay Sharma
''A note on Stackelberg equilibrium in duopoly: Strategic use of corporate social responsibility''
( 2018, Vol. 38 No.4 )
This paper demonstrates that in a duopoly model with firms being concerned about profit as well as corporate social responsibility (CSR), the outcome of game may coincide with the Stackelberg outcome. We argue that owner of the firm may use CSR orientation as a strategy to become Stackelberg leader in the quantity competition game.
Keywords: Stackelberg outcome, Corporate social responsibility, Cournot game, Duopoly, Non-profit orientation
JEL: L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Manuscript Received : Sep 03 2018 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 10 2018

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